\u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Blagojevich\u3c/em\u3e: A Standard Bait and Switch by Letizia, Timothy J.
Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 3
9-1-2010
United States v. Blagojevich: A Standard Bait and
Switch
Timothy J. Letizia
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Civil Procedure is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Timothy J. Letizia, United States v. Blagojevich: A Standard Bait and Switch, 6 Seventh Circuit Rev. 47 (2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
                            
UNITED STATES V. BLAGOJEVICH: A STANDARD 
BAIT AND SWITCH 
 
 
TIMOTHY J. LETIZIA∗ 
 
Cite as: Timothy J. Letizia, United States v. Blagojevich: A Standard Bait and 
Switch, 6 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 47 (2010), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr 
/v6-1/letizia.pdf. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“How do you all like your first year of law school?” asked the 
man with the perfectly groomed hair. The response from the students 
at Chicago-Kent College of Law was mixed: some smiled, others 
shrugged, and the rest were too mesmerized by the hair and shiny suit 
to respond. “Well, I didn’t do so great in law school, but look at me 
now; I’m the Governor of Illinois.”  
Less than four months after that brief visit to Chicago-Kent, news 
of the Governor’s arrest was splashed across headlines throughout 
Illinois, the United States, and even the world: “Illinois Gov. Rod 
Blagojevich arrested on federal charges.”1  
Not surprisingly, Blagojevich’s arrest, impeachment, and 
subsequent removal from office—most notably for his attempt to sell 
President Barack Obama’s vacated United States Senate seat—
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2008, Saint Louis University. 
1 See, e.g., Jeff Coen, Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich Arrested on Federal 
Charges, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.chicagotribune.com 
/news/politics/obama/chi-blagojevich-1210,0,7494354.story; Illinois Governor 
Arrested on Corruption Charges, EURONEWS (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.euronews 
.net/2008/12/09/illinois-governor-arrested-on-corruption-charges/. 
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garnered massive amounts of attention from the public and the media.2 
For those interested in following his downfall and subsequent 
expulsion from public office, there was a nearly endless stream of 
sources from which to obtain information, including online sources 
such as blogs,3 Twitter,4 and Facebook.5 Even those members of the 
public who wished to avoid the media frenzy surrounding Rod 
Blagojevich were hard-pressed to avoid daily updates; this was 
especially true when Blagojevich’s federal trial date was announced.6  
Following the announcement of the trial date, the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge James B. Zagel presiding) 
began to receive e-mails and letters from members of the general 
public containing advice as to how he should rule.7 In light of the 
great public interest surrounding the trial, Judge Zagel stated in a 
public status hearing that he had “given some consideration to p
anonymity of the jurors at [least] until the trial is over.”
ublic 
      
8 Judge Zagel 
considered deferring disclosure of the jurors’ names in order to prevent 
members of the public from contacting the jurors.9  
On May 17, 2010, Judge Zagel held an informal and off-the-
record meeting with members of the media to discuss his intention to 
keep the names of the jurors anonymous until a verdict was 
                                           
2 See, e.g., Ray Long, Impeached Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojev
Removed From Office, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 30, 2009), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/new
ich Has Been 
s/local/chi-blagojevich-impeachment-
remo
HE BLAGO BLOG, http://blogs.suntimes.com/ 
blago
09), 
http:
at 6, United States v. 
Blag
ates at 4, United States v. Blagojevich, 612 
F.3d th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-2359).  
val,0,5791846.story?page=2. 
3 See, e.g., Natasha Korecki, T
/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
4 http://twitter.com/governorrod. 
5 http://www.facebook.com/pages/Rod-Blagojevich/9367545725. 
6 See Blagojevich Trial Date Set for June 3, 2010, FOX NEWS (June 25, 20
//www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/25/blagojevich-trial-date-set-june/.  
7 Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants 
ojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-2359). 
8 Brief & Appendix of the United St
 558 (7
9 Id.  
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rendered.10 Two weeks after this meeting and two days before jury 
selection was set to begin, The Chicago Tribune, The New York Tim
and three media groups (hereinafter “Press Intervenors”) filed a 
motion to intervene and for immediate public access to the names of
jurors.
es, 
 
ct 
rors 
s.”  
 It 
d 
11 The Press Intervenors brought this motion in order to obje
to an anonymous jury.12 The Press Intervenors were interested in 
publishing human-interest stories and determining whether the ju
were “suitable decision-maker 13
Before holding a hearing on the Press Intervenors’ motion, Judge 
Zagel assured the potential jurors that their names would not be 
disclosed until the conclusion of the trial.14 Judge Zagel then held a 
hearing and denied the Press Intervenors’ motion on the basis that it 
was untimely and there was “a legitimate reason for sealing the names 
during trial.”15 Judge Zagel anticipated “that the substantial attention 
being devoted to the criminal charges against a former Governor of 
Illinois would lead the press and public to bombard jurors with email 
and instant messages that could undermine their impartiality (and 
perhaps their equanimity).”16 Further bolstering Judge Zagel’s 
decision was the fear that public knowledge of the jurors’ identities 
“would discourage others from agreeing to serve in future trials.”17
is important to note, however, that the parties and their counsel would 
be given access to the names of the jurors; Judge Zagel’s ruling relate
only to the delayed release of the jurors’ names to the public.18 
                                                 
10 Id. at *5.  
11 Press Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and for Immediate Public Access to 
Names of Jurors at 1, United States v. Blagojevich, 2010 WL 2934476 (N.D. Ill. July 
26, 2010) (No. 08 CR 888). 
12 Id. 
13 United States v. Blagojevich (Blagojevich I), 612 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
14 Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 8, at 8. 
15 Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
16 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 559. 
17 Id. at 562.  
18 Id. at 559.  
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Determined to obtain the jurors’ names, the Press Interv
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, contending that the press has an 
unqualified right of access to jurors’ names under the First 
Amendment.
enors 
s an 
d, 
, 
 
urden 
 
 in 
e 
er and remanded the case with 
instr  
                                                
19 The Seventh Circuit did not agree that the press ha
unqualified right of access to the names;20 instead, the court stated that 
there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’ 
names.21 In its analysis of whether this presumption had been rebutte
the Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to rely on the First Amendment; 
instead, the court used statutes and the common law.22  Importantly
the First Amendment, common law, and statutory law each carries its 
own distinct standard by which the presumption can be rebutted.23
Notably, the First Amendment standard carries a more rigorous b
for rebutting the presumption than the common law and statutory 
standards.24 However, instead of applying the common law and 
statutory standards to its common law and statutory analysis, the 
Seventh Circuit applied the more rigorous First Amendment standard
to its analysis.25 Ultimately, the court held that the presumption
favor of disclosure had not been rebutted.26 The court vacated Judg
Zagel’s deferred-disclosure ord
uctions to grant the Motion to Intervene and hold proceedings
consistent with its opinion.27  
 
19 Id. at 561. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 563. 
22 Id. 
23 See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (statutory 
standard); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise 
I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (First Amendment standard); Rushford v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (common law standard); United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Plan for Random Selection 
of Jurors (Dec. 2006), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf 
(statutory standard). 
24 See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. 
25 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 564. 
26 Id. at 563. 
27 Id. 
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This Note considers whether the Seventh Circuit applied the 
correct standard when it analyzed the issue of whether the jurors’ 
names should be kept from the public until verdict was rendered in 
Blagojevich’s case. Part I of this Note provides a background as to 
when jurors’ names can be withheld from the public. Part II provides
background of the Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Blagojevi
Part III argues that the panel incorrectly applied a First Amendment 
standard to its common law and statutory analysis of whether the 
jurors’ names should be kept secret, and thereby erased the distinction 
among First Amendment, common law, and statutory analyses of this 
issue in the Seventh Circuit. Finally, Part IV argues that this distinct
should be revived because if a court is unable to use the common law
standard—which carries a lower burden than the First Amendment 
standard—i
 a 
ch. 
ion 
 
n the future, it may result in the release of jurors’ names 
when they otherwise would have been protected from the public and 
th
 
I. UBLIC ACCESS TO JURORS’ NAMES PRIOR TO VERDICT IS NOT AN 
r 
extends to most aspects of a criminal trial, including the identities of 
jurors.30 This presumption of openness with regard to jurors’ identities 
      
e media. 
 P
ABSOLUTE RIGHT 
 
A. A Presumption of Openness  
 
In the United States of America, “a presumption of openness 
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of 
justice.”28 This presumption stems in part from the fact that “[o]u
system of jurisprudence abhors the ancient star chamber inquisitions,” 
in which accused Englishmen were subjected to secret trials and 
deprived of their rights.29 Consequently, the presumption of openness 
                                           
28 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). 
29 Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 967 (Pa. 1995). 
30 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563. Presumption of openness also extends to: 
voir dire, Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); preliminary hearings, Press-
Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal for Cnty. of Riverside (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 
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stems from three distinct sources: (1) The First Amendment, (2) 
common law, and (3) and statutory law. 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 
the Supreme Court created the Experience and Logic Test31 in order 
“[t]o determine what aspects of a criminal trial are subject to a 
presumptive right of public access under the First Amendment.”32 The 
Experience and Logic Test requires courts to evaluate two 
complementary considerations to determine whether information is 
subject to the right of access.33 The “experience” prong is used to 
determine “whether the place and process have historically been open 
to the press and general public,” and the “logic” prong is used to 
consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.”34 In United States v. 
Wecht, the Third Circuit employed the Experience and Logic Test and 
concluded that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access 
to jurors’ identities.35 Notably, in United States v. Blagojevich, the 
Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to rely “on the [F]irst [A]mendment 
as the means of obtaining the [juror] information.”36 Instead, the 
Seventh Circuit relied on the two other sources mentioned above: the 
common law and statutes.37 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court 
stated that there is a “common-law right of access to judicial 
records.”38 The “long-recognized presumption in favor of public 
access to judicial records” gives the public the right “to monitor the 
functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect 
                                                                                                                   
1 (19 ); judicial records, Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); 
and t self, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555. 
2, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). 
s-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
ojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010). 
86
he criminal trial it
31 478 U.S. at 9. 
32 United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 22
33 Pres
34 Id.  
35 537 F.3d at 239. 
36 Blag
37 Id. 
38 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
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for our legal system.”39 This right of access includes a right to inspect 
and copy both public and judicial records and documents.40 This righ
has also been extended to include the disclosure of juror names; for 
example, in United States v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit found 
that the presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’ nam
t 
es finds its 
root
 
ion to the norm of disclosure, an exception that 
need
d 
inct standard by which the presumption of openness 
can be rebutted.45 
 
1. First Amendment Standard 
d 
s in the common-law tradition of open litigation.41 
In addition, the presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’ 
names can stem from the Jury Selection and Service Act, which 
provides that each plan for jury selection must “fix the time when the
names drawn from the qualified jury wheel shall be disclosed to the 
parties and to the public.”42 As acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit, 
“[t]he answers ‘never’ or ‘after trial’ are possible under this language 
but constitute an except
s justification.”43  
Importantly, the presumption that jurors’ names will be disclose
under any one of these three sources is not absolute.44 Each source 
carries its own dist
 
A district court can attempt to rebut the presumption in favor of 
disclosure using a First Amendment standard. The controlling standar
                                                 
39 In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984). 
40 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597. 
41 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563. 
42 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (emphasis 
added). 
43 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563. 
44 Id. at 561. 
45 See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (statutory 
standard); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (First Amendment standard); 
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(common law standard); United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, Plan for Random Selection of Jurors (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf (statutory standard). 
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is found in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 
I), a case in which the Supreme Court found that the First Amendment 
makes the jury selection process presumptively open to the public.46 
As s
along with 
ndings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine 
a, 
rt held that the closure of a suppression hearing over the 
objections of the accused must meet the standards set out in Press-
Enterprise I
st consider 
asonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must 
t of 
urors 
                                                
tated in Press-Enterprise I, under the First Amendment:  
 
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an 
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential 
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. The interest is to be articulated 
fi
whether the closure order was properly entered.47 
 
The Supreme Court reiterated this standard in Waller v. Georgi
where the Cou
:  
 
Under Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to close the 
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to 
be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary 
to protect that interest, the trial court mu
re
make findings adequate to support the closure.48 
 
The First Amendment standard was also applied in the contex
juror name disclosure in United States v. Wecht.49 In Wecht, the Third 
Circuit held that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of 
access to obtain the names of both trial jurors and prospective j
 
46 464 U.S. 501. 
47 Id. at 510 (emphasis added). 
48 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). 
49 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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prior to empanelment of the jury, and that the district court failed to 
rebut this presumption t standard.50 
on 
e 
 Additionally, the 
trial ht of 
t 
d 
w 
nt 
com
 
 
                                                
 under the First Amendmen
 
2. Common Law Standard 
 
Instead of using a First Amendment standard, a district court can 
attempt to rebut the presumption in favor of disclosure via a comm
law standard. As stated in Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., th
presumption of access “can be rebutted if countervailing interests 
heavily outweigh the public interests in access.”51
 court may weigh “the interests advanced by the parties in lig
the public interests and the duty of the courts.”52  
A comparison of the common law standard against the First 
Amendment standard makes it clear that “[t]he common law does no
afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press an
the public as does the First Amendment.”53 While the common la
simply calls for “countervailing interests,”54 the First Amendme
requires an “overriding interest.”55 Furthermore, while the First 
Amendment requires that closure be “narrowly tailored,”56 the 
mon law only requires a weighing of countervailing interests to 
determine if they heavily outweigh the presumption of access.57
The ability of a court to rebut this presumption under the common
law finds its roots in the court’s inherent power to control the 
proceedings in front of it.58 This implied judicial power is “governed 
 
50 Id. at 240 (finding that the district court’s reasons for rebutting the 
presumption were “conclusory and generic” and lacked the specificity required by 
the First Amendment standard).  
51 Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis added). 
52 Id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)).  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
56 Id.  
57 Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. 
58 See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).  
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not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts
manage their own affairs so as to
59
 to 
 achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases.”  According to Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 
“inh
cific grant by constitution or 
gislation; a power which can neither be taken away nor 
 
 
rical 
ion of 
 juror names “call[s] for an exercise of judgment” on 
the 
 release of 
 In 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court recognized the 
                                                
erent power” is defined as:  
 
A power essential to the very existence of the court or its 
ability to function in dispensing justice . . . A power included 
within the scope of a court’s jurisdiction which a court 
possesses irrespective of spe
le
abridged by the legislature.60  
 
In the context of disclosure of juror names, some courts have 
concluded that a trial court’s inherent power to control courtroom 
proceedings includes the power to control the release of juror names.61
In Gannet Co. v. State, the court stated: “Indeed other courts have
noted that the theory of the jury at common law supports an histo
tradition of judicial discretion as to disclosure of juror names.”62 
Similarly, Judge Posner argued in his dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc of United States v. Blagojevich that the quest
whether to release
part of the trial judge, based on the judge’s experience and 
common sense.63 
Furthermore, in the context of high-publicity cases, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged the right of a trial court to manage the 
courtroom and courthouse premises, and even restrict the
information by counsel, witnesses, newspeople, and court staff.64
 
59 Id. at 43. 
60 BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).  
61 Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 746 (Del. 1989). 
62 Id. 
63 United States v. Blagojevich (Blagojevich II), 614 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 
2010) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
64 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). 
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“pervasiveness of modern communications” and the potentially 
prejudicial impact that it can have on jurors.65 In light of this fact, the
court stated that trial judges must use their power to “ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused.”
 
 
prevent 
es before trial because it cuts off the 
possibility of prejudicial impact. 
 
3. Statutory Standard 
f 
 
 in favor of disclosure “if the interests of justice so 
requ
quires each district court to 
adopt a jury-selection plan, which must:  
ential in any case where the interests 
f justice so require.69  
 
                                                
66 The court further 
advised that “the cure lies in those remedial measures that will 
the prejudice at its inception”;67 one such remedial measure is 
deferring disclosure of jurors’ nam
 
Instead of using the First Amendment or the common law, a 
district court can also attempt to rebut the presumption in favor o
disclosure by using a statutory standard. The Jury Selection and
Service Act provides express statutory authority to abridge the 
presumption
ire.”68  
The Jury Selection and Service Act re
 
[F]ix the time when the names drawn from the qualified jury 
wheel shall be disclosed to parties and to the public. If the 
plan permits these names to be made public, it may 
nevertheless permit the chief judge of the district court, or 
such other district court judge as the plan may provide, to 
keep these names confid
o
 
65 Id. at 362.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 363.  
68 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78; see United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Plan for Random Selection 
of Jurors (Dec. 2006), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf.  
69 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (emphasis added). 
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This section of the Act—particularly the sentence on “the interests 
of justice”—gives district courts discretion to overcome the 
presumption of openness and withhold juror names from the public.70 
According to the Act’s legislative history, the Act “permits the present 
diversity of practice to continue. Some district courts keep juror names 
confidential for fear of jury tampering. Other district courts routinely 
publicize the names.”71 If a trial court withholds juror information 
under the Jury Selection and Service Act, a showing of arbitrariness is 
required to reverse the decision.72 
In addition, the Jury Selection and Service Plan adopted by the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois states 
that: 
 
No person shall make public or disclose to any person, unless 
so ordered by a judge of this Court, the names drawn from 
the Qualified Jury Wheel to serve in this Court until the first 
day of the jurors’ term of service. Any judge of this Court may 
order that the names of jurors involved in a trial presided 
over by that judge remain confidential if the interests of 
justice so require.73 
 
This plan, like the Jury Selection and Service Act, provides that a 
judge may keep juror names confidential “if the interests of justice so 
require.”74 Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nixon v. 
Warner Communications that “the decision as to access is one best left 
to the sound discretion of the trial court,” Judge Posner argued that the 
                                                 
70 United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
71 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing H.R. REP. No. 
1076, at 11 (1968)). 
72 United States v. Tucker, 526 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1976). 
73 United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Plan for 
Random Selection of Jurors (Dec. 2006), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ 
ILNDJuryPlan.pdf (emphasis added). 
74 Id. 
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plan does not require the judge to hold a hearing to determine whether 
the names of jurors shall remain confidential.75 
  
4. Anonymity, Deferred-Disclosure, Sequestration, Special Instruction 
 
If a court is successful in overcoming the presumption of 
openness using one of the three standards above, the court can then 
use an anonymous jury,76 deferred-disclosure,77 sequestration, or 
special instruction to keep the jurors’ names from the public. 78  
When a judge decides to withhold indentifying information 
regarding jurors—particularly their names—the jury is considered an 
“anonymous jury.”79 With a full-fledged anonymous jury, the jurors’ 
names will never be revealed to the public; on the other hand, when a 
judge decides to temporarily withhold the names of the jurors, the term 
used is “deferred-disclosure.”80 
As an alternative to anonymity or deferred-disclosure, a judge can 
make a special instruction to the jury to prevent any risks associated 
with disclosure.81 For example, a judge can “instruct jurors not to 
answer calls, listen to voice mails, or open e-mails and letters from 
numbers and addresses they do not recognize.”82 Finally, the most 
extreme option for keeping jurors out of the public eye is called 
“sequestration”; if a judge sequesters a jury, the jurors will be isolated 
from members of the general public during trial.83  
 
                                                 
75 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 297 (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978)). 
76 See United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1217 (7th Cir. 1992). 
77 See United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
78 United States v. Blagojevich (Blagojevich III), No. 08 CR 888-1, 6, 2010 
WL 2934476, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010).  
79 United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215 (7th Cir. 1992).  
80 United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
81 Blagojevich III, 2010 WL 2934476, at *9. 
82 Id.  
83 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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5. Reasons for Restricting Access to Jurors’ Names 
 
In most cases, the parties and the public know the names and 
other identifying information of jurors.84 However, in certain criminal 
trials, “special precautions must be taken in order to protect jurors 
from harassment, intimidation, anxiety, and a host of other disruptive 
influences.”85 Indeed, as stated in United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 
 
[S]ome combination of the following factors may support the 
empanelment of an anonymous jury: (1) the defendant’s 
involvement in organized crime, (2) the defendant’s 
participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors, (3) 
the defendant’s past attempts to interfere with the judicial 
process, (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendant will 
suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary 
penalties, and (5) extensive publicity that could enhance the 
possibility that jurors’ names would become public and 
expose them to intimidation and harassment.86 
 
In Ochoa-Vasquez, the court held that all five factors were 
present.87 The defendant was linked “to an organized criminal 
organization with a history of violence and obstruction of justice,” he 
faced a lengthy sentence if convicted, and “his prior connections to [a 
Colombian drug] cartel promised to make [it] a high-profile trial.”88 
While the use of an anonymous jury typically arises in an organized 
crime trial like Ochoa-Vasquez, where juror safety or intimidation is a 
primary concern, it can also be useful in the context of high-profile 
cases.89  
                                                 
84 United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215 (7th Cir. 1992). 
85 Id. at 1215 n.10. 
86 428 F.3d 1015, 1034 (11th Cir. 2005). 
87 Id. at 1034. 
88 Id. at 1034–35. 
89 See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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For instance, Sheppard v. Maxwell was a high-profile case in 
which the defendant was a young doctor who was accused of 
bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death.90 The trial attracted a 
“swarm” of reporters, photographers, and television and radio 
personnel,91 leading the Supreme Court to comment that the publicity 
created a “carnival atmosphere.”92 In Sheppard, the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether the defendant “was deprived of a 
fair trial . . . because of the trial judge’s failure to protect [him] 
sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity 
attended his prosecution.”
that 
: 
                                                
93 In answering this question in the 
affirmative, the Supreme Court was concerned not only with the 
defendant’s due process rights, but with the jurors’ privacy rights as 
well.94 The Court stated
 
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an 
impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the 
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty 
of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, 
the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the 
balance is never weighed against the accused.95  
 
 Due to advances in technology, the pervasiveness of modern 
communications that the Supreme Court was concerned about when 
Sheppard was decided in 1966 has only increased since that time.96 As 
a result, some courts have taken strong measures, including the 
 
90 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966). 
91 Id. at 339. 
92 Id. at 357. 
93 Id. at 335. 
94 Id. at 353–62.  
95 Id. at 362. 
96 See id.  
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empanelment of anonymous juries or deferred disclosure of jurors’ 
names in high-profile cases.97  
 As noted above, in Sheppard, the Supreme Court was also 
concerned with protecting the jurors’ privacy interests: 
 
[T]he jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by the 
judge’s failure to insulate them from reporters and 
photographers. The numerous pictures of the jurors, with 
their addresses, which appeared in the newspapers before and 
during the trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion 
from both cranks and friends. The fact that anonymous letters 
had been received by prospective jurors should have made 
the judge aware that this publicity seriously threatened the 
jurors’ privacy.98  
 
A judge can protect jurors’ privacy interests from this type of publicity 
in high-profile trials by restricting access to the jurors’ names and 
other identifying information.99 Without access to the jurors’ names, 
the press will have a more difficult time “transform[ing] jurors’ 
personal lives into public news.”100  
Support for the notion that some high-profile cases warrant 
restricting access to jurors’ names can also be found in United States v. 
Edwards, decided by the Fifth Circuit in 2002.101 Edwards is 
strikingly similar to the Blagojevich case: one of the defendants,
former Governor of the State of Louisiana, was convicted of 
exploiting his apparent ability to influence Louisiana’s riverboat 
gambling license process.
 a 
e 
                                                
102 The governor’s trial attracted intens
 
97 See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 
(Del. 1989). 
98 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353 (citations omitted). 
99 See Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618. 
100 Id. at 630. 
101 See 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002). 
102 Id. at 610.  
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media interest, involved a defendant who was a polarizing figur
Louisiana politics, and generated “highly charged emotional and
political fervor.”
e in 
 
to 
s in 
t’s 
                                                
103 While acknowledging that restricting access 
juror information typically occurs in organized crime trials, the Fifth 
Circuit stated that this measure may be appropriate in a case that 
“attracts unusually large media attention and arouses deep passion
the community.”104 The Fifth Circuit thus held that the district cour
decision to withhold juror information was appropriate in this high-
profile case.105 
 
II. UNITED STATES V. BLAGOJEVICH 
 
A. Factual Background  
 
 Former Governor Rod Blagojevich was arrested on federal 
corruption charges on December 9, 2008.106 The charges alleged that 
he conspired to sell President Barack Obama’s vacated United States 
Senate seat, engaged in “pay-to-play” schemes, and misused state 
funding to fire Chicago Tribune editorial writers.107  
The Illinois House of Representatives impeached Blagojevich by 
a 114–1 vote on January 8, 2009.108 This was the first time in Illinois’ 
“190-year history that a governor has been impeached.”109 In late 
 
103 Id. at 614. 
104 Id. at 613. 
105 Id. at 617. 
106 Illinois Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich and His Chief of Staff John Harris 
Arrested on Federal Corruption Charges, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRESS RELEASE 
(Dec. 9, 2008), http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/dec09_08.htm. 
107 Id. 
108 Ray Long & Rick Pearson, House Votes to Impeach Blagojevich, THE 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 9, 2009), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/ 
2009/01/live-blog-of-il.html. 
109 Id. 
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January, 2009, Blagojevich went on a media blitz proclaiming his 
innocence, going so far as to schedule eleven interviews in one day.110  
On January 29, 2009, the Illinois Senate removed Blagojevich from 
office by a 59–0 vote, convicting him on an article of impeachment.111 
The Senate also voted 59–0 to bar Blagojevich from ever holding 
public office again in the State of Illinois.112  
United States district Judge James Zagel set a trial date for June 3, 
2010.113 While Blagojevich was ultimately convicted by a federal jury 
on one count of lying to the FBI, his conviction is not the focus of this 
Note.114 Instead, this Note will focus on the events leading up to the 
start of Blagojevich’s federal trial—specifically, the hearings and 
meetings held by Judge Zagel relating to the issue of disclosure of the 
names of the jurors who would ultimately decide Blagojevich’s fate. 
 
B. Press Intervenors’ Argument  
 
On June 1, 2010, the Press Intervenors moved to intervene and for 
immediate public access to the names of the jurors.115 The Press 
Intervenors made this motion for the limited purpose of objecting to an 
                                                 
110 Alex Koppelman, Rod Blagojevich Has Only Just Begun to Fight, THE 
SALON (Jan 27, 2009), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2009/01/27/ 
blago/index.html. 
111 Malcolm Gay & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich Ousted by Illinois State Senate, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/30 
illinois.html. 
112 Id. 
113 Jeff Coen, Corruption Trial for Blagojevich Set for June 3, 2010, CHICAGO 
BREAKING NEWS CENTER (June 25, 2009), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/ 
2009/06/corruption-trial-for-blagojevich-set-for-june-3.html. 
114 Jeff Coen, John Chase, Bob Secter, Stacy St. Clair & Kristen Mack, Guilty 
on Just 1 Count, Blago Taunts U.S. Attorney, CHICAGO BREAKING NEWS CENTER 
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/08/14th-day-for-
blagojevich-jury.html. The jury deadlocked on the other twenty-three counts against 
Blagojevich, and a mistrial was ordered on those counts. Id. A new trial is set to take 
place 2011 on those remaining counts. Id. 
115 Press Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and for Immediate Public Access to 
Names of Jurors, supra note 11, at 1. 
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anonymous jury and seeking immediate public access to the jurors’ 
names.116 In their motion, the Press Intervenors argued that there was 
no valid reason to keep the jurors’ names anonymous and that sealing 
the names would be contrary to the tradition of open trials and right of 
access guaranteed by the First Amendment and the common law.117  
The Press Intervenors argued that juror names are presumptively 
open to the public absent extraordinary circumstances and that this 
presumption of access is mandated by both the First Amendment and 
common law.118 In support of their argument, the Press Intervenors 
reasoned that “[k]nowledge of juror identities allows the public to 
verify the impartiality of key participants in the administration of 
justice.”119 The Press Intervenors also argued that Judge Zagel’s 
concern—“that revealing jurors’ names in a high-profile case would 
tempt ‘bloggers’ to contact them during trial”—could be eliminated by 
the tools that the court has at its disposal.120  
The Press Intervenors then argued that the Experience and Logic 
Test from Press-Enterprises II confirms that the constitutional right of 
access has specific application to juror names.121 Analyzing the 
“experience” prong, the Press Intervenors cited three cases suggesting 
that there has been a well-established tradition of access to juror 
names.122 Analyzing the “logic” prong, the Press Intervenors cited 
three additional cases suggesting that public access to juror names 
“plays a significant and positive role” because it allows the public to 
verify the impartiality of jurors and educates the public on the judicial 
system.123  
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 2.  
118 Memorandum in Support of Press Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and for 
Immediate Public Access to Names of Jurors at 1, United States v. Blagojevich, 
2010 WL 2934476 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 08 CR 888). 
119 Id. at 2 (citing United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 4.  
122 Id. at 5. 
123 Id. at 6 (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990)).  
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The Press Intervenors then argued that, in Blagojevich’s case, 
there was no justification for an anonymous jury that could overcome 
the constitutional presumption of openness.124 The Press Intervenors 
argued that the presumption had not been overcome because neither 
the court nor the parties had shown “any threats, jury tampering or 
‘other evils affecting the administration of justice’ that justify 
withholding jurors’ identities from the media.”125 Rather, the Press 
Intervenors argued that the “heavy, First Amendment-freighted burden 
cannot be sustained by a generalized belief that it would be better for 
jurors to remain anonymous, lest they be beset by bloggers.”126  
Finally, the Press Intervenors attached an affidavit of Matt 
O’Connor, a Chicago Tribune editor, in support of their motion. In the 
affidavit, Matt O’Connor stated that based on his personal experience 
and research there is a tradition of openness in the jury selection 
process which includes public access to the jurors’ names in high 
profile cases.127 While stating that the rare exceptions to public access 
typically involve cases where jury safety is at issue, he acknowledged 
that there have also been “notable exceptions” in high-profile cases 
such as the trial of Conrad Black.128 
 
C. District Court’s Hearing on Press Intervenors’ Motion  
 
On June 3, 2010, Judge Zagel held a hearing on the Press 
Intervenors’ motion.129 The motion was denied for the reasons stated 
                                                 
124 Id. at 8. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 10. 
127 Affidavit of Matt O’Connor in Support of Motion to Intervene and for 
Immediate Public Access to Names of Jurors at 2, United States v. Blagojevich, 
2010 WL 2934476 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 08 CR 888).  
128 Id. at 3; see United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (denying motion to disclose final jury list for the case of Conrad Black, a 
Canadian businessman whose trial for fraud “generated intense international media 
interest”). 
129 Notification of Docket Entry at 1, United States v. Cellini (N.D. Ill. June 3, 
2010) (No. 08 CR 888).  
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in open court.130 Displeased with Judge Zagel’s denial of their motion, 
the Press Intervenors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit.131 However, before analyzing the appeal, it is 
important to understand why Judge Zagel denied the Press 
Intervenors’ motion; a portion of Judge Zagel’s reasoning is revealed 
in the Press Intervenors’ appellate brief.132 
As described in the Press Intervenors’ appellate brief, Judge Zagel 
began the hearing by addressing the timeliness of the Press 
Intervenors’ motion to intervene. Judge Zagel stated that the Press 
Intervenors’ motion was “untimely” and should have been filed much 
earlier.133 Importantly, Judge Zagel ruled that even if the Press 
Intervenors’ motion were timely, he would still deny the motion on the 
merits, because he “concluded that there was a legitimate reason for 
sealing the names during trial.”134  
Judge Zagel stated that the Blagojevich case was “different” 
because it had attracted “enormous public attention, an enormous 
expression of views.”135 Judge Zagel was also concerned about 
improper contact with jurors by “bloggers” and others via the Internet: 
“[I]t strikes me that there has been extraordinary attention paid to this 
case, that [leads] not only to the expression of opinions, but to people 
seeing an opportunity to get noticed, and one way to get yourself 
noticed is to do something in connection with this particular case.”136 
Judge Zagel was also concerned with the fact that members of the 
public can use e-mail to communicate secretly with jurors, and stated 
that this must be avoided.137 
Importantly, the Press Intervenors acknowledged that Judge 
Zagel’s concerns were not merely hypothetical because he had 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants, supra note 7, at 1. 
132 See id. at 4–6. 
133 Id. at 4. 
134 Id. at 4–5. 
135 Id. at 5.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 5–6. 
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received e-mails and letters from members of the public containing 
advice as to how he should rule.138 Furthermore, although the Press 
Intervenors argued that Judge Zagel rejected out of hand the 
alternatives to juror anonymity that they suggested, they 
acknowledged that Judge Zagel thought it would be unfair to prohibit 
members of the jury from reading unsolicited e-mails.139 
 
D. Government’s Argument  
  
The Government provided two arguments in its appellate brief. 
First, the Government argued that it was not an abuse of discretion to 
deem the motion to intervene untimely.140 The Government noted that 
a full year before trial, the Press Intervenors were on notice that Judge 
Zagel was considering deferring disclosure of juror names.141 Instead 
of intervening then, the Press Intervenors waited “until the eve of 
trial.”142 Furthermore, once Judge Zagel definitively decided to defer 
disclosure, the Press Intervenors waited two weeks to move to 
intervene, and noticed their motion for hearing “on the very day jury 
selection was set to begin.”143 The Government argued that the 
“appellants’ delays deprived the district court and the parties of an 
opportunity for due deliberation,” which justified Judge Zagel’s 
decision to deny the Press Intervenors’ motion.144 Further bolstering 
the Government’s argument was the fact that Judge Zagel already told 
the jurors that they would not be identified by name.145 
Second, the Government argued that it was not an abuse of 
discretion for Judge Zagel to defer disclosure of the jurors’ names to 
                                                 
138 Id. at 6.  
139 Id. 
140 Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 8, at 12. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 8. 
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the public until verdict.146 The Government argued that the Press 
Intervenors “failed to establish that access to juror names prior to 
verdict is a right guaranteed to them by the First Amendment or the 
common law, rather than a matter of discretion traditionally and 
appropriately vested in the district court.”147 The Government argued 
that even if a qualified right to juror names prior to verdict exists, the 
circumstances of this case—including the “unprecedented” amount of 
public attention and substantial risk that “seated jurors would become 
the targets of unsolicited, and presumptively prejudicial, contacts”—
warranted deferred disclosure.148  
Like the Press Intervenors, the Government embarked on an 
analysis of the Experience and Logic Test to determine if the First 
Amendment provides a qualified right of access to juror names.149 
Based on an analysis of statutes and case law, the Government 
concluded that it did not.150 The Government concluded by requesting 
that the Seventh Circuit affirm Judge Zagel’s denial of the Press 
Intervenors’ motion to intervene.151  
 
E. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion  
 
Chief Judge Easterbrook wrote the Seventh Circuit opinion, which 
was issued on July 2, 2010.152 That same day, a member of the court 
asked for a vote on whether to rehear the case en banc.153 “After the 
                                                 
146 Id. at 13. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 19. 
150 Id. at 20. 
151 Id. at 40. In their reply brief, the Press Intervenors criticized the 
Government’s brief as “reflect[ing] a cramped conception of the press’s and public’s 
right of access to criminal proceedings that is fundamentally at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.” Reply Brief of Intervenor-
Appellants at 1, United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-
2359). 
152 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 558 (7th Cir. 2010).  
153 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 287 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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judges exchanged comments, but before the voting on whether to grant 
rehearing en banc was complete, the panel decided to alter its opinion 
to meet some of the concerns expressed in the exchange of 
comments.”154 Ultimately, a majority of the judges voted against 
hearing the appeal en banc.155  
On July 12, 2010, the panel issued its amended opinion,156 which 
is the subject of this section. In the amended opinion, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the motion to intervene was timely157 and that the 
presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’ names had not been 
rebutted.158 The Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Zagel’s deferred-
disclosure order and remanded the case with instructions to grant the 
motion to intervene and hold proceedings consistent with its 
opinion.159 
The panel began by addressing the timeliness of the motion to 
intervene and concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to deem the 
motion untimely.160 While the panel acknowledged that Judge Zagel 
had assured the jurors that their names would not be revealed during 
trial, the panel correctly stated that this assurance occurred after the 
motion to intervene had been filed.161 As a result, the court refused to 
make Judge Zagel’s “declaration a self-fulfilling prophecy.”162 The 
panel acknowledged that the Press Intervenors were adequately 
notified that Judge Zagel was considering deferred-disclosure of juror 
names in mid-2009, and that they had to recognize that it was a 
possibility in this case because “[t]wo years earlier a district judge had 
deferred the release of jurors’ names in another high-profile criminal 
                                                 
154 Id. at 288 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
155 Id. at 287 (majority opinion). 
156 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 561 (7th Cir. 2010). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 563.  
159 Id. at 565. 
160 Id. at 560. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. 
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prosecution in the Northern District of Illinois.”163 However, the panel 
stated that Judge Zagel likely would have rejected a motion to 
intervene in mid-2009 as “premature.”164 The panel ultimately held 
that the Press Intervenors’ motion to intervene was not untimely as 
“[t]here was never a public announcement identifying an issue and 
specifying a schedule for its resolution.”165 
The panel then proceeded to address the merits of the appeal. The 
panel rejected the Press Intervenors’ contention that the press has an 
unqualified right of access to jurors’ names during trial, stating that 
“no one contends (or should contend) that jurors’ names always must 
be released.”166 Rather, the panel was concerned with the justification 
behind a judge’s decision to defer release of jurors’ names—or to not 
release them at all.167 The panel acknowledged that Judge Zagel had a 
legitimate interest in deferring disclosure and that the Press 
Intervenors had a legitimate interest in requesting that the names be 
released.168 
Although the panel accepted that both sides had legitimate 
interests in this matter, it refused to analyze the matter through the lens 
of the First Amendment, as the Press Intervenors and Government had 
in their briefs.169 The court gave three main reasons for this refusal: 
(1) “there is no general constitutional ‘right of access’ to information 
that a governmental official knows but has not released to the 
public,”170 (2) the jurors’ names were not revealed during voir dire 
“not because of the judge’s decision but because of § 10(a) of the 
district court’s plan for implementing the Jury Selection and Service 
                                                 
163 Id. (citing United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 
2007
1.  
phasis in original). 
 
)). 
164 Id. at 560–6
165 Id. at 561.  
166 Id. (em
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 562. 
169 Id. at 563 
170 Id. at 562.  
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Act,”171 and (3) “[a] court should never begin with the 
Constitution.”172 Rather than use the First Amendment, the panel 
analyzed this matter via statutes and the common law, arguing that the 
public has a common-law right of access to information that affects 
the 
rd 
ng this presumption, which was stated in the opinion as 
follows:  
 it must make findings adequate to support 
e closure.175  
n 
, no 
the jury plan adopted by the Northern District of Illinois, and asserted 
                                                
resolution of federal suits.173 
The panel derived a presumption in favor of disclosure of juror 
names from both the common law tradition of open litigation and the 
Jury Selection and Service Act.174 The panel also provided a standa
for rebutti
 
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure 
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the 
proceeding, and
th
 
The panel determined that under this standard, the presumption i
favor of disclosure of jurors’ names had not been overcome because 
Judge Zagel did not make any findings of fact and did not provide an 
opportunity to present evidence.176 Furthermore, the panel argued that 
this presumption was not rebutted because “no evidence was taken
argument entertained, no alternatives considered, and no findings 
made before this decision was announced to the jurors.”177 The panel 
also analyzed the language of the Jury Selection and Service Act and 
 
171 Id. at 562–63.  
172 Id. at 563. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 563–64; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (2006). 
175 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 564 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 
(1984)). 
176 Id. at 563. 
177 Id. at 564. 
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that any exceptions to the norm of disclosure required “justification” 
and “some procedure to make the necessary finding.”178  
Notably, however, the panel stated that the justification required 
for deferred disclosure of juror names is less than the justification 
required for empanelling an anonymous jury.179 Furthermore, the 
panel determined that the evidence a judge must consider “depends on 
what the parties submit.”180 Indeed, the panel cited to United States v. 
Black, in which the parties presented no evidence, and the court 
decided whether the jurors’ names should be disclosed based on “the 
parties’ arguments and the judge’s experience with jurors’ concer
and behavior.”
ns 
has 
                                                
181 In comparison, the court stated that Judge Zagel “
referred elliptically to efforts to contact him by email and in other 
ways” and suggested that Judge Zagel put details on the record to help 
demonstrate some of the potential effects of releasing the jurors’ 
names.182  
Ultimately, the court stated that “[w]hat is essential—what 
occurred in Black but not so far in this case—is an opportunity for the 
parties (including the intervenors) to make their views known in detail, 
followed by a considered decision that includes an explanation why 
alternatives to delayed release of the jurors’ names would be 
unsatisfactory.”183 Rather than deciding outright when it is appropriate 
to delay the release of jurors’ names, the Seventh Circuit required a 
new, and more complete, hearing.184 The court remanded the case with 
instructions to grant the motion to intervene and to hold a hearing 
consistent with its opinion.185 
 
 
 
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 565.  
181 Id. 
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
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F. Judge Posner’s Dissent  
 
Although Judge Posner’s dissent is from the denial of rehearing 
en banc, the crux of his analysis focuses on Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion and Judge Zagel’s decision to defer disclosure of the jurors’ 
names.186  
Judge Posner began by endorsing Judge Zagel’s handling of this 
matter: “An experienced trial judge made a reasonable determination 
that the release of jurors’ names before the end of trial would expose 
the jurors to the widespread mischief that is a daily if not hourly 
occurrence on the Internet.”187 Judge Posner reiterated the important 
fact that the jury was not anonymous; rather, the parties knew the 
jurors’ names, and the public would know them after the trial ended.188 
Judge Posner argued that in light of this fact, and “[g]iven the 
extremely high profile of this case nationwide as well as in Illinois, 
and the unusual attention-getting conduct of the principal defendant 
and his wife, there is no good argument for releasing the jurors’ names 
before the trial ends.”189  
Next, Judge Posner criticized the panel’s decision for not 
recognizing how serious the repercussions could be if Judge Zagel 
were forced to renege on his promise to defer release of juror 
names.190 Though the panel acknowledged that it would be 
“regrettable to disappoint jurors’ legitimate expectations,”191 it failed 
to recognize that “jurors may well be upset, concerned for their 
privacy, fearful of the prospect of harassment . . . and angry at having 
been induced by false pretenses to agree to take months out of their 
life to perform jury service.”192  
                                                 
186 See generally Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 288–97 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, 
J., dissenting). 
187 Id. at 287. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 287–88.  
190 Id. at 288. 
191 See Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 2010). 
192 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 288 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Posner then criticized the panel’s argument that, unlike the 
parties in the Black case, the parties and intervenors here did not have 
an opportunity “to make their views known in detail.”193 Judge Posner 
argued that the parties and intervenors had this opportunity, but failed 
to present any evidence of consequence.194 Indeed, he noted that Judge 
Zagel, unlike Judge St. Eve in Black, “actually had a bit of trial-type 
evidence before him,” which was the affidavit from The Chicago 
Tribune editor.195 Therefore, Judge Posner concluded that “the media 
have submitted evidence, that evidence was before Judge Zagel when 
he ruled, and the media do not argue that they were prevented from 
submitting more evidence.”196 He further argued that the media did 
not submit additional evidence because of their belief that the Fi
Amendment gives them the right to the jurors’ names unless there are 
threats made against the jurors.
rst 
                                                
197 
Judge Posner also criticized the panel’s reliance on “trial-type” 
evidence, stating “trial-type evidence is neither required for, nor likely 
to be helpful in, the judge’s exercise of discretion to withhold jurors’ 
names from the public until the trial ends.”198 Rather, Judge Posner 
posited that a trial judge should decide whether to defer disclosure of 
juror names based on experience, common sense, and judgment.199 
Next, Judge Posner argued that the jurors’ interest in their privacy 
during a lengthy high-profile trial trumps the public’s interest in 
learning the jurors’ identities prior to verdict.200 Importantly, Judge 
Posner did not have to address the parties’ interests because 
Blagojevich did not object to Judge Zagel’s deferred-disclosure order, 
and the Government’s interest was in line with the jurors’ interest.201 
 
193 Id. at 290. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 294; see supra Part II.B. (describing affidavit in detail). 
196 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 294 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 290.  
199 Id.  
200 Id. at 292.  
201 Id.  
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Citing to a number of law review articles, Judge Posner presented a 
number of benefits to juror anonymity; he also endorsed Judge St. 
Eve’s approach in United States v. Black:  
 
In a case like this that has garnered intense national and 
international media attention, releasing juror names during 
the pendency of trial threatens the integrity of the jurors’ 
ability to absorb the evidence and later to render a verdict 
based only on that evidence. This is the case because 
disclosure increases the risk of third-party contact by the 
press or by non-parties who are monitoring these proceedings 
through the vast media attention this case has gathered.202 
 
Judge Posner opined that because the prosecution of Rod 
Blagojevich was of an even higher-profile than that of the defendant in 
Black, Judge Zagel’s decision to defer disclosure should have been 
upheld without a new hearing.203 Judge Posner then argued that the 
Press Intervenors’ decision not to ask for a hearing was a forfeiture 
that the court neglected to enforce.204 He noted that the Press 
Intervenors did not ask for a hearing in their motion to intervene or in 
their appellate briefs.205 Rather, they simply asked for the jurors’ 
names in the district court, and asked that Judge Zagel be ordered to 
release the names on appeal.206 
Finally, Judge Posner criticized the panel for “overrul[ing] Judge 
St. Eve’s sensible ruling rejecting any presumption in favor of 
disclosure of jurors’ names before verdict.”207 Judge Posner was 
critical of the grounds on which the panel overruled Judge St. Eve—
namely, the “common-law right of access by the public to information 
                                                 
202 Id. at 293 (citing United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (N.D. Ill. 
2007)). 
203 Id. at 295. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 296.  
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that affects the resolution of federal suits.”208 He rejected the notion 
that access to juror names falls within a presumption in favor of public 
access to judicial records based on the fact that jurors’ names are not 
judicial records.209 Furthermore, even assuming that there is a federal 
common-law right of access to juror names, Judge Posner argued that 
it has been supplanted by legislation—specifically, the Jury Selection 
and Service Act and the jury plan for the Northern District of 
Illinois.210 Judge Posner argued that these two pieces of legislation 
allowed Judge Zagel to use his discretion and withhold juror names 
until verdict.211 
 
 III. ANALYSIS 
 
In United States v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit recognized 
three bases by which judicial proceeding information is made 
available to the press and public: (1) the First Amendment right of 
access,212 (2) the common-law presumption of openness,213 and (3) 
the Jury Selection and Service Act.214 While each of these bases 
functions primarily to make information available to the press and 
public, each basis also carries its own distinct standard by which the 
presumption of openness can be rebutted.  
                                                
Under the First Amendment, the presumption of openness can 
only be rebutted by an “overriding interest” with closure “narrowly 
tailored” to serve that interest.215 Under the common law, the 
presumption of openness can be rebutted if “countervailing interests” 
 
208 Id. 
209 Id.  
210 Id. at 297; see supra Part I.A.  
211 Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 297 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
212 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
213 See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
214 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78. 
215 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
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heavily outweigh the public interests;216 furthermore, the trial court 
may weigh “the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public 
interest and the duty of the courts.”217 Notably, “[t]he common law 
does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the 
press and the public as does the First Amendment.”218 Finally, under 
the Jury Selection and Service Act, the presumption can be rebutted if 
the “interests of justice so require.”219 
The Seventh Circuit recognized the aforementioned distinctions 
and explicitly refused to use the First Amendment as a vehicle to 
analyze whether the district court had overcome the presumption in 
favor of disclosure of jurors’ names.220 Instead, the panel decided to 
use “statutes and the common law.”221 However, the panel failed to 
apply the appropriate standard when it analyzed the issue.222 Rather 
than applying the common law and statutory standards to its common 
law and statutory analysis, the panel—without explanation or 
announcement—incorrectly applied the heavier-burdened First 
Amendment standard to its analysis.223 
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit, quoting Waller v. Georgia, 
applied the following standard to orders providing for anonymity of 
jurors:  
 
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure 
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternative to closing the 
                                                 
216 Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. 
217 Id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)).  
218 Id. 
219 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7). 
220 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 564.  
223 Id. 
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proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support 
the closure.224  
 
However, the Seventh Circuit did not quote the standard in full—
it failed to include two crucial words: “Under Press-Enterprise.”225 
The full quote from Waller v. Georgia reads as follows:  
 
Under Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to close the 
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to 
be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary 
to protect that interest, the trial court must consider 
reasonable alternative to closing the proceeding, and it must 
make findings adequate to support the closure.226 
 
Inclusion of the words “Under Press-Enterprise” is crucial 
because Press-Enterprise—as the Seventh Circuit explicitly 
acknowledged at the outset of its opinion—is a First Amendment 
case.227 Without these words, it is not clear that a First Amendment 
standard is being applied; with them, the truth is revealed. 
Therefore, it is clear that although the Seventh Circuit recognized 
a distinction among the First Amendment, common law, and statutory 
law, it effectively erased the distinction by applying a First 
Amendment standard to its analysis of statutory and common law. As a 
result of this opinion, there is serious question as to whether the 
distinction remains because the First Amendment standard is applied 
regardless of the basis by which the issue is analyzed. This distinction 
should be revived because if a court is unable to use the common law 
standard—which carries a lower burden than the First Amendment 
standard—in the future, it may result in the release of jurors’ names 
                                                 
224 Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)). The Seventh 
Circuit stated that this standard was “also true of orders providing for the anonymity 
of jurors.” Id.  
225 See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. 
226 Id. 
227 See Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 561. 
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when they otherwise would have been protected from the public and 
the media. Finally, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit has broken ranks 
by not maintaining the distinction among the First Amendment, 
common law, and statutory law. Other circuits have retained the 
aforementioned distinction, recognizing that a common law right of 
access analysis is distinct from the constitutional analysis in various 
contexts.228  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In United States v. Blagojevich, District Judge James Zagel 
recognized that the jurors’ names should not be disclosed until the 
conclusion of the trial.229 The Press Intervenors seeking access to 
these names appealed to the Seventh Circuit, claiming that “the press 
has an unqualified right of access to jurors’ names while th
proceeds.”
e trial 
                                                
230 This claim was based principally on two First 
Amendment cases, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, and United 
States v. Wecht.231  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to analyze the 
issue under the First Amendment, and instead decided to follow 
common law and statutory law.232 However, the panel incorrectly 
 
228 See, e.g., United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(retained distinction in context of juror name disclosure); San Jose Mercury News, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.-N.D. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (retained 
distinction in context of access to report); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 
811 (10th Cir. 1997) (retained distinction in context of sealing court documents); 
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (retained 
distinction in context of disclosure of discovery documents).  
229 Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
230 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 561. 
231 Id.; see Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (concluding that the 
First Amendment makes voir dire presumptively open to the public); United States 
v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (extending this approach to jurors’ 
names even when not mentioned during voir dire). 
232 Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563. The Seventh Circuit made it clear that a 
judge could not make a decision to defer disclosure of jurors’ names simply on the 
basis of inherent judicial power. Id. at 564. 
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 81
applied a First Amendment standard to its common law and statutory 
analysis. Furthermore, the panel did so without stating that the genesis 
of the standard was First Amendment case law. 
In its opinion, the panel established a distinction among First 
Amendment,233 common law,234 and statutory235 analyses of rebutting 
the presumption of openness. However, the panel eliminated this 
distinction by applying a First Amendment standard to its common law 
and statutory analysis of whether jurors’ names should be disclosed.236 
The panel incorrectly erased this historic distinction and thus created a 
significant risk for the future; it is now possible that a court will be 
unable to apply a common law standard, which may result in the 
improper release of jurors’ names.237 
 
                                                 
233 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
234 See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
235 See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78. 
236 See Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 564. 
237 Id. Ultimately, on remand, Judge Zagel made the correct decision to defer 
disclosure of jurors’ names until the end of trial. See Blagojevich III, No. 08 CR 888-
1, 6, 2010 WL 2934476, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010) However, he applied the 
wrong standard from the Seventh Circuit. See id. at *5. 
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